<\/p>
In January 1916 Douglas Haig \u2013 who had been commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force for less than a month \u2013 should have resolved to devote more time to sorting out the BEF\u2019s training.<\/p>\n
As 1915 turned into 1916, there was no centralised body devoted to examining the lessons of the fighting, using them to inform doctrine, and then training the army accordingly. Unfortunately, Haig did not prioritise training, and it was not properly reformed until early 1917.<\/p>\n
However, we know from his diary that Haig did make one resolution, and that was to promote the best talent \u2013 regardless of whether he got on with them or not. \u201cI had no \u2018friends\u2019 when it came to military promotion, and I would not tolerate a \u2018job\u2019 being done.\u201d<\/p>\n
In 1916, Haig largely stuck by this resolution. He had an uneasy relationship with General Sir Henry Rawlinson, whom Haig thought was devious and lacking in integrity. Yet Haig recognised \u2018Rawly\u2019s\u2019 skill as a soldier, and gave him the lead role on the Somme in July 1916. Rawlinson\u2019s record at the Somme was patchy, but he grew into the job and proved a highly effective commander in the victorious 1918 campaigns.<\/p>\n
Gary Sheffield is a military historian whose books include Douglas Haig: From the Somme to Victory (Aurum Press, 2016)<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0 The question of who would succeed Elizabeth I<\/a> was a thorny one \u2013 and her new year\u2019s resolution of 1586 should have been to settle the issue by naming James VI<\/a> of Scotland as her heir. The two monarchs had endured a fraught relationship over the previous six years, but by then they were negotiating a treaty of alliance, and James desperately wanted a guarantee that he was next in line for the English throne to be included among its terms.<\/p>\n Though there was a danger that the king might engage in plots against Elizabeth to hasten his accession, it was more likely that he would wait patiently for her death, secure in the knowledge that his right was formally recognised in England. But Elizabeth resisted the pressure. As a result, Anglo-Scottish conflicts and tensions continued after the Treaty of Berwick was signed in July 1586, and political and religious uncertainty marked the final decade of Elizabeth\u2019s reign.<\/p>\n Elizabeth\u2019s refusal to make provision for the succession also harmed her reputation both at the time and since. For a queen who purported to care deeply for her subjects, it showed a remarkable insensitivity to their fears and concerns.<\/p>\n Susan Doran is a senior research fellow in history at Jesus College, Oxford, specialising in the reign of Elizabeth I<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0 As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt contemplated the start of presidential election year, he would have been well advised to resolve to respect the place of the US supreme court in political life.<\/p>\n In the 1936 election, FDR convincingly defeated his Republican opponent Alfred Landon. By then, the American people were willing to credit the sitting president with ameliorating mass unemployment and providing leadership in intensely troubled economic times.<\/p>\n However, Roosevelt\u2019s post-election plan to pack the court with his supporters \u2013 FDR requested congressional authority to appoint a new supreme court member for every justice aged over 70 and who had served for at least 10 years \u2013 was a step too far. Roosevelt was transparently seeking to shore up his liberal New Deal legislation against conservative judicial action.<\/p>\n The reform plan failed, and instead brought together conservative Democrats, civil-liberty advocates and Republicans in opposition to the president and to the later New Deal. Though judicial opposition to the New Deal was soon in retreat, the \u2018packing\u2019 plan was conceived in hubris and executed with an uncharacteristic high-handedness that caused significant damage to Roosevelt\u2019s presidential reputation.<\/p>\n John Dumbrell is professor of government at the University of Durham\u2019s School of Government & International Affairs<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0 At the start of 1016, Cnut<\/a> was a landless Viking prince with the English kingdom in his sights. By the end of 1016 he was established in London as ruler, and his rival, King Edmund Ironside<\/a>, was dead \u2013 but getting there had involved a hard fight. Cnut could have saved himself a great deal of trouble if he\u2019d made a dash for England\u2019s principal city sooner.<\/p>\n Edmund\u2019s father, King \u00c6thelred (\u2018the Unready\u2019), had begun the year in London, where the English army was calling vainly for him to lead it. Cnut had received supplies from the royal heartland of Wessex in 1015, so was in a good position to strike. However, during the spring of 1016 his attention was taken by affairs in the north of England.<\/p>\n It seems that \u00c6thelred was ill. If Cnut had known that, and headed straight for London, he might have invoked his legitimacy as the son and heir of the Anglo-Danish king Sweyn Forkbeard (who ruled 1013\u201314), and applied pressure on \u00c6thelred.<\/p>\n As it happened, \u00c6thelred died before Cnut arrived in London in April, but the delay allowed \u00c6thelred\u2019s son to declare himself king. That meant that Cnut had to fight, before making peace with Edmund. It was only thanks to Edmund\u2019s sudden death at the end of 1016 that Cnut avoided the complications of a kingdom ruled by rival kings.<\/p>\n Ryan Lavelle is a reader in medieval history at the University of Winchester<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n Anne Boleyn<\/a> would have been glad to see the back of 1535, which had been something of an annus horribilis for Henry VIII<\/a>\u2019s second queen. There is evidence to suggest that she had suffered a second miscarriage in early summer; her marriage was rapidly deteriorating; and she was increasingly at loggerheads with the king\u2019s chief minister, Thomas Cromwell<\/a>.<\/p>\n Though Cromwell had helped Anne secure Henry\u2019s hand and shared her reformist tendencies, they had fallen out badly over the Dissolution of the Monasteries<\/a>. Anne had argued that funds from the monasteries should be diverted to charitable causes rather than to the royal coffers, as Cromwell had arranged. She had made no secret of the fact that she \u201cwould like to see his head off his shoulders\u201d.<\/p>\n By the end of 1535, though, Cromwell was by far the most powerful man at court and, crucially, had the king\u2019s ear. When Henry instructed his chief minister to get him out of the marriage after Anne\u2019s miscarriage early the following year, Cromwell used this as an opportunity to get rid of her for good. He concocted a case of adultery \u2013 involving not just one but five men, including her own brother \u2013 and she was condemned to death<\/a>.<\/p>\n If Anne had made it her new year\u2019s resolution to forge an alliance with Cromwell in 1536, it might have saved her life. The ever-resourceful minister could have applied his brilliant legal mind to having her marriage to the king annulled. He might even have persuaded Henry to give Anne a second chance.<\/p>\n Tracy Borman is a historian and an expert on the Tudor period \u00a0 With his father almost on his deathbed, the soon-to-be King Edward VIII<\/a>\u2019s new year\u2019s resolution should have been: \u201cI must marry a suitable wife, have children and thus ensure the succession.\u201d Given his total infatuation with Wallis Simpson<\/a>, the most that could have been hoped for was: \u201cI must not marry an unsuitable wife.\u201d The prime minister, Stanley Baldwin hoped for no more \u2013 he was resigned to serving a bachelor king with a mistress kept more or less discreetly in the background. He had no such luck.<\/p>\n There can be not the slightest doubt that Edward\u2019s resolution was, in fact: \u201cI must marry Wallis, and marry her as soon as possible!\u201d This was his all-consuming preoccupation \u2013 there was no room in his mind for any lesser issue.<\/p>\n Philip Ziegler is a historian and author of the official biography Edward VIII (Harper, 2012)<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0 During the first nine months of 1066, Harold Godwinson<\/a> did well \u2013 and his success was in large part because he\u2019d stolen a march on his rivals. When Edward the Confessor<\/a> died on 5 January, Harold immediately had himself proclaimed king, and was crowned the very next day. When his troublesome younger brother Tostig invaded in May, Harold hurried down to Sandwich to see him off, and when Tostig returned in September with the Norwegian king Harald Hardrada, Harold rushed north to surprise them at the battle of Stamford Bridge, winning a famous victory.<\/p>\n Naturally, therefore, when Harold heard soon afterwards that Duke William of Normandy<\/a> had landed in Sussex, he thought that speed would be his friend, and sought to repeat his earlier success, hoping to catch William off-guard. But a swift engagement was precisely what his rival wanted. As invaders, the Normans<\/a> had poor supply lines, and no local support of the kind that Tostig and Harald had enjoyed in the north.<\/p>\n Had Harold waited just a little longer, he could have assembled a larger army and watched as the Normans struggled to keep their army fed by foraging. Instead, he rushed into battle at Hastings<\/a> \u2013 and looked up at precisely the wrong moment.<\/p>\nElizabeth I: \u201cI\u2019ll name James\u00a0VI as my heir\u201d<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n\n
Franklin D Roosevelt: \u201cI\u2019ll respect the political system\u201d<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n\n
Cnut: \u201cI\u2019ll roll the dice and head for London\u201d<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n\n
Anne Boleyn: \u201cI\u2019ll make friends with Cromwell\u201d<\/h3>\n<\/div>
Edward VIII: \u201cI won\u2019t marry Wallis\u201d<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n\n
Harold Godwinson: \u201cI won\u2019t be so hasty\u201d<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n\n